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Urbanization, the Intelligentsia, and
Meaning Change: A Comment on
Horacio Spector’s Value Pluralism
and the Two Concepts of Rights

CHRISTOPHER T. WONNELL*

Professor Horacio Spector presents an interesting account for how a
plurality of values can sneak its way into our normative world under the
guise of unitary terminology.1 In particular, the rhetoric of rights was
once primarily used to refer to moral protections extended to spheres of
autonomous, individual decisionmaking. Over time, however, rights
were used to depict any claims in which individuals could assert that
particular preferences of theirs were of sufficient weight to warrant their
protection by law.
Professor Spector also presents a kind of causal theory for how this
metamorphosis occurred.2 Values are emanations from forms of life, but
they can outlast the forms that brought them into being. Rights as
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1. See Horacio Spector, Value Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rights, 46 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 819 (2009).
2. Id. at 821 (“New value paradigms coexist with older value paradigms because
the latter are central to forms of life that continue to define people’s senses of identity
and meaningfulness. By the same token, values are incommensurable with one another
because each value presupposes a distinct form of life that cannot be ranked
along an ordering of forms of life. That is, values are incommensurable with
each other due to the incommensurability of their supporting forms of life.” (footnote
omitted)).
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autonomous decisionmaking were a natural response to sparsely
populated rural settings; one imagines a farmer standing proudly in a
remote field as lord of his manor. They became increasingly obsolete as
the world became urban and interdependent—where no man was an
island, and the consequences of individual choices were rarely limited to
defined private spheres. We might have responded to this change in
objective conditions by abandoning rights talk as “nonsense upon stilts”
and embracing the modernity of utilitarian or consequentialist theories
that see the individual as a moral resource for the community.3 Instead,
rights talk became ubiquitous—individuals are claimed to have rights to
an education, healthcare, housing, and the rights to be free from torture,
cruel punishments, and discrimination. But most of these uses of the
term rights are not best conceptualized as protections for spheres of
autonomous decisionmaking. The individual’s interests may have pride
of place in these conceptions, but the dominant idea is sympathy for the
welfare of the individual rather than respect for the autonomous capacity
for making choices and plans.
In my view, Professor Spector’s paper is more persuasive in
identifying the rhetorical change that has taken place than in providing a
causal account of its genesis. The traditional rights of private property
and freedom of contract do seem a long way from the new rights to
receive medical care or safe and affordable housing. However, the ruralto-urban hypothesis for the cause of this change is not especially
persuasive. Laissez-faire thinking of autonomous private spheres was at
its height in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, among
conditions far more urban and commercial than had historically been the
case and among countries such as England and Holland that were more
urban than most at the time.4 It has also made a remarkable comeback in
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries in countries where
urban crowding can make Manhattan seem bucolic.
I do not want to overstate the criticism. It is certainly true that the
ability of people to do whatever they want with what they own can be
challenged by conditions of urban living. For example, the animals I
could keep on a farm are a nuisance in the city. And subtle environmental
problems such as the depletion of the ozone layer remind us that local
decisions in a hugely populated and technologically powerful world can
have consequences far beyond any defined physical sphere. Broad

3. Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, in NONSENSE UPON STILTS: BENTHAM,
BURKE AND MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN 46, 53 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1987).
4. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 25 (7th ed. 2007) (“Many
legal doctrines date back to the nineteenth century, when a laissez-faire ideology based
on classical economics was the dominant ideology of the educated classes.”).
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environmental awareness, however, has been a rather recent phenomenon,
and commentators had administered an enormous beating to private
rights for a hundred years before the Clean Air Act.5 Moreover, it is
perfectly possible to tackle environmental problems by creating new
spheres of autonomous decisionmaking through careful institutional use
of rights, such as tradeable pollution permits.
In any event, there is something fundamentally wrong about the theory
that regards interdependence and complexity as inconsistent with
spheres of private jurisdiction or rights. The system of private spheres is
one that connects all owners of property—including property in labor—
in a worldwide network of contractual relations. It is precisely because
people are interdependent that it is essential to receive ongoing signals
about changing relative scarcities everywhere on the planet, and that is
the principal function of the system of private spheres of property
connected by free contract. The institution of private rights is really
nothing but a mechanism for internalizing the externalities that arise
from increasing interdependence. If one thinks of the issue as status
versus contract, then the more complex the world becomes, the more
incredible it is to imagine that the state could be on top of every potential
status that could arise and would know the rules to optimally govern
persons in that status, including the prices that every producer should
charge.
If the change from simple rural to complex urban conditions is not a
compelling hypothesis for the definitional metamorphosis of the word
rights, what is? Perhaps we should ask, in the manner of a detective
investigation, who benefitted from the change in meaning? The older
conception of rights is one of jurisdictional limits, of respect for the
autonomous decisionmaking of others, and of the necessity to refrain
from intervening in defined spheres. In contrast, the newer conception
of rights is one of restructuring end states to ensure that individuals have
particular interests satisfied. The beneficiaries of the change in meaning
are those people who chafe under the jurisdictional limits of the earlier
rights approach and who yearn for the power to rearrange end states in
order to enable themselves to author reforms that will help save
individual victims of the previous end states.
It is possible that several different groups of people would benefit
from this change, but the most obvious winners are those who make
5.

42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2003).
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their living reimagining and—at least in aspiration—remaking the
world. Let us call this group the intelligentsia, which includes not only
professors in academia but also journalists and policy wonks in
government. The idea of large private spheres that are off limits
to intervention is anathema to the interests and worldview of the
intelligentsia. After all, these spheres contain the resources that are
needed for building the newly imagined worlds. And intellectuals are
especially disinclined to defer to the decisionmaking authority of
nonintellectuals, people who are often uneducated, inarticulate, and wise
only in pragmatically knowing how, rather than in theoretically knowing
that. In support of the hypothesis of intelligentsia power, one can note
that freedom of speech and of the press is the one sphere of off-limits
jurisdictional limitation that has thrived and expanded in the last
century.6
Rights is not the only term that has undergone the metamorphosis that
Professor Spector identifies. Other normative terms, such as justice,
have also been rethought in directions that feed the appetite for power of
the intellectual classes. Justice was once thought of as a constraint on
human actions.7 It was unjust to lie, break promises, steal, kill, or maim.
These deontic constraints can be a frustration for the impatient
intellectual, especially one with radical or revolutionary aspirations.
How much happier it is to think of justice as a property of desirable end
states that can be achieved by imagining comprehensive rearrangements
of the elements on the human chess board!
There is no need to postulate illiberal or otherwise unattractive
motives for the intelligentsia; indeed, imagining such motives would
misunderstand the essential process that took place. Normative
philosophers who thought about concepts like rights and justice were
usually trying to hold onto as much of the older conceptions of the terms
as they felt they could in good conscience and were trying to come up
with newer conceptions that would better promote the attractive features
of the earlier values. Most people who speak of rights strongly desire to
see the individual human being flourish and specifically hope to ensure
that identity will not be lost in an abstract collective. Similarly, “social
justice” is often thought of as being especially protective of the status of
the individual—an improvement on utilitarian norms that would allow
the sacrifice of one individual, without limit, if required to promote

6. Mark A. Graber, Old Wine in New Bottles: The Constitutional Status of
Unconstitutional Speech, 48 VAND. L. REV. 349, 375 (1995) (noting the dramatic expansion
of free speech rights in the third quarter of the twentieth century).
7. 2 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL
JUSTICE 33 (1976).
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enough utility for the rest of the group. The intelligentsia was trying to
hold onto the best features of rights and justice rhetoric without building
severe jurisdictional barriers on the only interventions that would make
the securing of these conceptions of rights and justice possible.
If Professor Spector’s hypothesis for the cause of meaning change in
terms such as rights and justice is accepted, what are its implications? In
the end, I believe I would draw conclusions very similar to those of
Professor Spector, notwithstanding our differences regarding causal
origins. The most important thing is to recognize that there are two
different conceptions of rights and two different conceptions of justice.
The conceptions are not similar enough to go by the same name without
confusion. Perhaps they both are enforceable claims of individuals, but
the nature of those claims and their sources and rationales are too
different to elide. It is not a matter of the newer conceptions lacking
value. We surely do need concepts of rights and of justice that will
stand as guarantors that the weakest among us are not simply abandoned
and left to suffer. But we also need the earlier concepts of rights as
jurisdictional limitations and of justice as constraints on violating those
limits, if we are to retain the vital benefits that come from such a system
of protected spheres.
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